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ABSTRACT 
 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the 
basic confusions of philosophy, and in the generally excellent attempts to connect 
classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. I take a modern Wittgensteinian 
view to place it in perspective. 
This book is a unique attempt to correlate classical Chinese philosophy with that of 
Searle (S), whom I regard as the best since Wittgenstein (W) and his intellectual heir. 
The quality of the articles is unusually high for such a collection, which must be due 
to Mou’s careful selection of papers. Readers will find it instructive to compare this 
with another recent volume of papers on S’s philosophy – “Thinking About the Real 
World”— another book on which I have written one of the very few reviews. As 
with W, everything that S writes is a treasure, but sadly this tome has attracted so 
little attention that this appears to be the only review, even though it appeared 6 
years ago. Its only real deficiency is the failure to print S’s reply to Allinson, since it 
would correct his numerous substantial mistakes. As noted in my other reviews, 
such mistakes are of interest since they are the universal defaults of our psychology 
due to the fact that our language lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue 
and Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. As the conference was taped, I tried to get 
the video or a transcript of S’s reply from Mou, S, Allinson and 3 persons at HKUST 
but nobody would help. 
The issue of spirituality is inevitably mixed in with the language issues of 
philosophy in some of the papers here. The many subtleties on the road to dispelling 
the illusion of the ego and the attaining of enlightenment are another issue entirely, 
although as in all other arenas, philosophical confusions inevitably arise when 
talking about religion, as opposed to practicing it. That is, philosophy in the broad 
sense, as musing on ethics, religion, morality, how we ought to live or feel about 
our life and the world is not the narrower sense in which W and S are practicing it, 
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though inevitably and almost universally the broad sense gets mixed with issues 
about how language (the mind as W showed us) works. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the 
basic confusions of philosophy, and in the generally excellent attempts to connect 
classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. I take a modern Wittgensteinian 
view to place it in perspective. 
This book is a unique attempt to correlate classical Chinese philosophy with that of 
Searle (S), whom I regard as the best since Wittgenstein (W) and his intellectual heir. 
The quality of the articles is unusually high for such a collection, which must be due 
to Mou’s careful selection of papers. Readers will find it instructive to compare this 
with another recent volume of papers on S’s philosophy – “Thinking About the Real 
World”— another book on which I have written one of the very few reviews. As 
with W, everything that S writes is a treasure, but sadly this tome has attracted so 
little attention that this appears to be the only review, even though it appeared 6 
years ago. Its only real deficiency is the failure to print S’s reply to Allinson, since it 
would correct his numerous substantial mistakes. As noted in my other reviews, 
such mistakes are of interest since they are the universal defaults of our psychology 
due to the fact that our language lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue 
and Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. As the conference was taped, I tried to get 
the video or a transcript of S’s reply from Mou, S, Allinson and 3 persons at HKUST 
but nobody would help. 
The issue of spirituality is inevitably mixed in with the language issues of 
philosophy in some of the papers here. The many subtleties on the road to dispelling 
the illusion of the ego and the attaining of enlightenment are another issue entirely, 
although as in all other arenas, philosophical confusions inevitably arise when 
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talking about religion, as opposed to practicing it. That is, philosophy in the broad 
sense, as musing on ethics, religion, morality, how we ought to live or feel about 
our life and the world is not the narrower sense in which W and S are practicing it, 
though inevitably and almost universally the broad sense gets mixed with issues 
about how language (the mind as W showed us) works. 
 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new 
discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only clear 
descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the problems are 
confusions about how language works, we are at peace and philosophy in his sense 
has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there is only one reality, so in the 
narrow sense, there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that 
can meaningfully be given, and we can only communicate in our one public 
language. W famously showed that there cannot be a private language and any 
“private inner” thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any role in our 
social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical problems in 
this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, 
then the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein" The Blue Book" 
p6(1933) 
 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock 
or background, and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which S calls the 
logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the language describing 
HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on philosophical aspects of 
human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into the W/S framework gives some 
clear descriptions which illuminate the use of language.  If not, then showing how 
they have been bewitched by language dispels the confusion. As Horwich has noted 
on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my 
review):“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed-
-yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth 
should be found satisfying enough.” 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say 
“describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes various 
“theories”, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are comprised of 
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a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language (the mind) works 
and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they become more like W’s 
perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” When there is a question 
one has to go back to the examples or consider new ones. As W noted, language 
(life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive (W being the unacknowledged 
father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike physics, where one can often 
derive a formula and dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the 
use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us astray in describing 
HOT and for me it is essential to keep in mind another of W’s famous comments: 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often 
demolished scientism, but there is a residue which evinces itself when he remarks 
in various writings that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made 
it abundantly clear that such words are constituted by many language games, which 
are the innate axiomatic basis of thought, and giving them up or even changing 
them substantially is not possible. I think the residue of scientism results from the 
major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to 
England to study). And, as it seems to me critical to understand the difference 
between the dispositional language games of “explaining” and “understanding”, 
permit me to quote W again. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“Every sign [WORD] is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be 
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capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian 
subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and 
there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute 
that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s above remark 
on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (for many years the leading expert 
on W) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ...What 
needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms 
of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their 
presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15(2005) 
 
Before making detailed remarks on the book, I will first offer some essential 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et 
al. It will help to see my reviews of S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making 
the Social World (MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA) and W’s BBB (Blue 
and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical Investigations), OC (On Certainty), and other 
books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order 
behavior, not found in complete detail anywhere that I have seen, that I will refer 
to as the W/S framework. 
 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social 
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Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some perspective. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had 
evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with 
basic utterances that can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) 
describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious automated System One, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location). We gradually developed the further 
ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe memories, 
attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary 
Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional 
attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental 
states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference 
Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, capacities, 
hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W   RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he 
loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) 
while third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent mental representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily 
more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories and reflexive 
actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and 
System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after 
System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in 
another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental 
states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
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Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests 
possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel until I act). Dispositions 
also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other 
ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are not 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably 
nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few --above all by John 
Searle, who made a simpler version of the table below in his classic book Rationality 
in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary 
psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid 
out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation 
stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive 
linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and in my view 
the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and thus 
in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and 
the recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits 
the world (originally called Causally Self Referential, but now Causally self-
reflexive by Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality 
over which no control is possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between 
desires or intentions and actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are 
descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in 
which the mind tries to fit the world. 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as 
SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this and 
described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the 
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mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory and 
so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior 
(the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts 
which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while 
Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- 
Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). 
 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations 
of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as 
perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my 
other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) and 
COS2 (public representations). To repeat this critical distinction, public Conditions 
of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his 
‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive 
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or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary 
or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted this 
terminology in the table.  
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists, but I find them of minimal 
utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
11 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are abilities to perform 
slow deliberative actions that are represented in consciousness (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A -my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive (self-referential), cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, 
change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not 
need language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, are 
not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not 
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have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the 
actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial 
explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have to 
state all the possible contexts – hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, true-
only mental states with a precise time and location) and over time there evolved in 
higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and 
time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of potential events (the past and 
future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
dispositions - the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 
slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public 
Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide 
into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again 
divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional 
attitudinal thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities 
and not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—fast 
and automatic to appear and disappear.  “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person 
statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the   1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
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believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and 
Language p118).  They are intrinsic, observer independent public representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System1 to System 2 – Searle - 
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 
-the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to 
represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s 
third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). 
S1 ‘thoughts’ are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 
1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) 
and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what 
I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology’). Note well that Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted   out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, 
Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his 
work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the 
groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue 
and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a 
simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It 
expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology 
developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his 
last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of 
behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics 
or Higher Order Thought, and in my view the single most important work in 
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philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PL G’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential--Searle) -- the 
unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking 
conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind 
tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W 
understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of 
examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which 
try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—
cf. Searle e.g., C+L    p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act --‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions — 
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or potential PUBLIC 
ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Temperature, Pain, Touch 
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MEMORIES:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
 
PREFERENCES, DISPOSITIONS, INCLINATIONS: (X might become True): 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS: of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, 
teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, 
Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public and Voluntary and transfer 
Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and 
Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE 
NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly 
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equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons 
organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to 
the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. 
Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or 
only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of 
cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as 
the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which 
produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and 
individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can
 enlarge our understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work 
and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them 
faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility--Bayesian utility maximization but Bayesianism is highly 
questionable) via dominance and reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons 
for Action-Searle- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2)  and impose 
Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts 
to the world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, 
sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John 
Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I 
strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much 
of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, 
concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be 
useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using 
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the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regar d these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions 
(inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike 
perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can 
have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in 
public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning 
(consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing language means 
manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. TOM (Theory of Mind) 
is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –my term-and UA1 and UA2 
for such functions in S1 and S2 ) –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology 
or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, 
self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting 
muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive 
rational S2D or nonrational automated S2A speech and action. We see that the 
efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already 
know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any 
phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum 
mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table 
is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only 
examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, public speech 
connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus 
the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely 
confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses 
depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I 
believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person 
expressive use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to 
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predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my mental state nor based on 
knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W). It does not 
describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s 
raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present 
tense are causally self-referential--they instantiate themselves but as descriptions of 
possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense 
or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain 
information that is true or false as they describe public acts that are or can become 
verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from 
subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s 
raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to 
convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle 
to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 
since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of 
S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many 
Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, 
non-Propositional and non-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, 
algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal- Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
“The basic form of the game must be one in which we act.” Wittgenstein in Klagge 
Philosophical Occasions p397(1993) 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order thought (HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
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dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our subcortical, involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- 
our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of cortical, voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons. That is, S2 consists of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and 
often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact 
that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, 
mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). UA is my term for what is 
usually called ‘theory of mind” and I think it is a critical distinction as it keeps in 
front of us the fact that the basis for our interaction with other beings is an automatic 
part of S1 and not an empirically decidable or modifiable function of S2. This is the 
basis for most of what is called “enactivism” or “embodiment” and it comes straight 
from W (though rarely acknowledged). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" 
and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less 
useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, 
since HOT cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of 
"cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of universal cultural deontic relationships (S3) so 
well described by Searle. I think this fairly well abstracts the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is 
21 
 
representational in the W/S sense of having public COS) and is downwardly causal 
(mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I 
would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending 
on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP (“first self”) 
as modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how 
we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination-- desires time 
shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of 
our slow thinking later evolved “second self”, are totally dependent upon (have 
their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the Causally Self Referential 
(CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and 
neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior 
intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the 
learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that 
dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One 
refers to the true-only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Referential (CSR)- (called reflexive or intransitive in W’s 
BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing etc.) 
which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way 
home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called 
transitive in BBB). 
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Note that COS, CSR, DOF, DIRA, Word to World etc. are all terms introduced or 
standardized by Searle but their division into COS1, COS2 etc. to accommodate the 
now dominant two systems framework is my own, which I regard as indispensable. 
 
To get S’s framework clear I have picked several quotes from his recent works. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32  
 
And a last comment from W—one of his most penetrating and universally relevant 
to thinking about behavior. 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? 
 
– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about processes 
and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of 
looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to 
know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been 
made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). — And now the analogy 
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which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny 
the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks 
as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny 
them.   W   PI p308 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As 
I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W 
is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional 
and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. 
However, since what S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise 
to S2 and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is 
able to become propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious 
activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious ones of S2. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean 
that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, 
and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and 
falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without consciousness. As W 
stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book “On Certainty”, life must be 
based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-- no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action 
(DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as 
follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in 
space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result 
sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his 
description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox 
is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generates the 
conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." 
Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama 
and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a 
change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant 
ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
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reflexive causal actions of S1, which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking 
of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing 
actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is, as there is no other possible criterion 
(COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find— beyond even Searle. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote 
from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there 
whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at 
all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"... ”Suppose 
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it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, 
then I do know." 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his 
examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With an evolutionary 
perspective, W’s later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is 
entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic 
value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the 
light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front 
of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of 
introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459).  Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and 
our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as 
Daniele Moyal Sharrock (DMS) but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the 
result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and with rare 
exceptions there is barely a mention. 
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The authors in this book are, like most philosophers and behavioral scientists, 
largely in the dark regarding subjects that I consider essential to a description of 
behavior—a good understanding of W and S, evolutionary psychology, 
automaticity of behavior and the two systems of thought. Nevertheless, they are 
generally thought provoking since they have as their theme the scintillating works 
of S.  The title of the first article on p35 by Cheng shows a basic and just about 
universal misunderstanding as it proposes to present a Neo- Confucian view of S’s 
philosophy. It should be obvious from the above that the basic philosophical issues 
are always about mistakes in language used to describe our universal innate 
psychology and there is no useful sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, 
Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can exist in the broad cultural or 
non- universal sense of philosophy, but that is not what philosophy of mind (or to 
W, S or me what any interesting and substantive philosophy) is about. It would take 
the whole review just to start on a reply to it and S does an excellent job, so I will 
just comment that re p35 propositions are S2 and not mental states which are S1, as 
W made quite clear over ¾ of a century ago, and that both Quine and Davidson 
were equally confused about the basic issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have 
done xlnt demolitions of Quine). As often, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to 
carry his understanding of W’s “background” to its logical conclusion (a failing of 
Hacker as well, as DMS has noted), and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that 
we might have to give up the concept of free will—a notion I find (with W) is 
incoherent as it is not something we can decide about. If some description of 
behavior is to have teeth, we should always be asking ourselves what actual impact 
it has on our life if we adopt it. If “choice” is a “meaningless” illusion, then there is 
really no COS at all, or does it have the same COS when our arm goes up when we 
want to scratch our ear as when it is pulled up by a string? 
 
S himself has countless times used W’s example of the difference between our arm 
going up because someone moves it, and going up because we make it do so. There 
is no further division of its going up to scratch our ear into voluntary and 
involuntary scratching. This is the bedrock or background--as W puts it, 
explanations and descriptions stop here. 
 
Philosophy, neuroscience and physics have nothing to add that changes the 
description in any way. 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our axiomatic 
EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W/S note frequently). 
“Reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, etc., are complex contextual language 
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games and they do not carry meaning along in little backpacks. One must dissect 
ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how another usage (context) differs. 
The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass are hands down the best lesson on how this has 
to be done, but Cheng has no idea and so lapses into incoherence many times a 
page. He can of course take comfort in the fact that he has millions for company. 
 
Fraser’s article (as S notes) is generally excellent as he does a rare thing—he actually 
understands alot of what S has written and gives a clear account of it. If only he had 
some grasp of all the other subjects I outlined above. Regarding his note 5 one needs 
to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a COS are thereby 
true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are true only). And the 
“radical under-determination of meaning” was first solved by W who noted that S1 
is true only. 
 
In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our 
linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists 
independently of our representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows a 
world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
We need to remind ourselves that the basic problem of philosophy is that, when the 
context is not clear—i.e., almost always when philosophizing-- you can say 
anything, but you cannot mean anything –i.e., only certain COS can apply in this 
context. 
 
Fraser’s discussion of intention p67-69 is good, but again in my view it is critical to 
be mindful of the difference between S1 (unconscious, involuntary, true only, 
nonlinguistic mental states) and S2 (conscious, voluntary, true or false, often 
linguistic and not mental states). A COS, or mental state or desire independent 
reason for action in S1 is utterly different from one in S2 and as I have often 
suggested (following W) one ought not to speak of them as S1 phenomena at all. As 
noted in my other reviews, if one insists to use such terms for both S1 and S2 then 
one should use COS1, COS2, DIRA1, DIRA2 etc. and keep firmly in mind that COS1 
are “internal criteria” (i.e., not really criteria at all) while COS2 are external public 
criteria that can be true or false. See Fraser’s notes 10 and 11. Fraser notes on p89 
that insofar as wu-wei is the idea that life can become entirely automated it must be 
confused—this would mean S2 or our conscious voluntary life disappears and we 
join the bacteria. Regarding note 37 I would comment that “background” is W’s 
concept long before it became S’s and that muscle contraction, though carried out 
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by S1 is often generated by S2—the only end result possible for our consciousness 
is contraction of muscles. S’s response mentions “high level” and “low level” which 
we should interpret as S2 and S1. 
 
Krueger’s article is a generally good “enactivist” or “embodied” account but we 
should note that W was the first enactivist and that S is one as well as they both 
insist on the COS as the test of meaningful behavior, and on the S1, S2 framework 
(though they do not use these terms). He does however go overboard in suggesting 
wu-wei is superior to S’s account and makes the usual error in suggesting that we 
“explain” behavior rather than just describing it and, like nearly everyone, has no 
clue that the best description of behavior and of the axiomatic functioning of S1 is 
that of W, especially in his last work “On Certainty”. Again, I suggest the recent 
book by Hutto and Myin for a rigorous account of the S1, S2 orientation in 
“Radicalizing Enactivism” (see my review). Krueger calls this the 
“internalism/externalism” debate. His misunderstandings are nicely summarized 
on p106 when he says the wu-wei refers to “inner states” and that its depiction of 
action without representation is at odds with S’s account. But it is clearly not, as it 
depicts S1 and S perfectly well describes S1. At issue here is what S has nicely 
termed The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), which roughly means that S1 is not 
available to consciousness and so is not “real”. On p122 he indicates that S implies 
intentionality is solely present in the brain but neither S nor W ever says this and 
constantly show that the basic concept of meaning is COS, which is a public act or 
occurrence. The confusion of his statement of embodiment or enactivism is 
epitomized in the last sentence of section 5 on p123 with “Intentionality is not a 
logical feature of mentality but rather a lived relation that is enacted through our 
embodied engagement with the world.” The cure is to cross out “not” and change 
“but rather” to “and”. S1 and S2 feed back into each other and combine the primitive 
automatic reflexive behaviors with the advanced conscious linguistic dispositions 
to produce actions with public COS. S’s response is a classic description of 
intentionality and TPI which should be memorized by all those interested in human 
behavior. One should read his article “The Phenomenological Illusion” and my 
reviews of his books and those by and about W, especially that of Johnston’s 
“Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner.” S condenses a huge cloud of philosophy into 
a few drops of grammar in the first paragraph on p126 when he notes that our 
intentionality (i.e., the S2 part of it) is representational because it can succeed or fail-
-i.e., be true or false—i.e., be propositional as it has external public COS whereas S1 
does not. 
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Allinson makes most of the basic mistakes about how language (mind, behavior) 
works, as most people do when they philosophize, and so it is inevitable that he 
gets S wrong as well. 
 
As noted, it would be of great interest to have S’s response to Allinson, but it was 
not printed and nobody was able to help me get it. So there is only a short comment 
by S who thinks these are not Chinese but Western confusions, but it is clear they 
are universal ones. 
 
The next few papers had some mildly interesting comments on Chinese philosophy 
and religion but nothing of any substance on S or philosophy in the narrow sense. 
Martinich is a well-known author on language but sadly he has hardly a clue about 
what S or W have done. Regarding Willman there is again nothing about the basic 
framework for describing behavior and so the unconscious true-only S1 gets mixed 
with conscious dispositional S2 with the usual disastrous results (see middle of 
p265), and again S is way too kind. 
 
Nuyen’s paper brings up the fact that few people understand that in most contexts, 
if behavior varies from one person to another that means it’s cultural and not innate. 
Every normal person enjoys eating but its culture that makes some like raw 
earthworms. Regarding S’s response, the quickest and clearest way I know to 
understand desire independent reasons for action (and how to separate DIRA1 
from DIRA2) is to read my reviews of S. 
 
Chong’s paper is mostly about philosophy in the broad sense and I would only 
comment that pretty much all previous notions of morality, ethics and rights seem 
obsolete. As we head for total collapse of what passes for civilization we need to 
have a long term global ecological basis for these, as is commonly noted. One of my 
favorites in this regard is the Wittgensteinian philosopher Rupert Read, who has 
used this perspective to deconstruct the work of Rawls (e.g., “A Theory of Justice”). 
 
The article by Fraser and Wong shows some grasp of S but (as is almost universal) 
it is truly amazing to see people try to describe (not explain as that takes us in a 
whole different direction—i.e., to a dead end) behavior with little understanding of 
S1, S2, dispositions, evolutionary psychology, automatism, twin studies etc. Only 
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p316-17 were of interest to me and I have already commented on this. 
 
Stroll is a senior scholar and W expert but I see problems in both his remarks and 
S’s on the subject of our certain knowledge. The comments on p345 fail to note the 
complex and highly varied language games subsumed by “knowledge”, 
“certainty”, “evidence”, “true”, “proof” etc. We can speak of “evidence” of water 
when we see what looks like a pond in the distance but not when we are standing 
next to it watching the ducks swim around. Only philosophers would use it the 
latter way and it’s not an intelligible use. Hands down the best treatment I know of 
how falsifiable statements become true only and of the axiomatic basis of 
knowledge is W’s “On Certainty”. 
 
Lum’s paper is pretty good, as we would expect from a former student of S’s, but 
there is some unclarity. Perhaps we see the origin of this in S’s reply p377, where he 
fails to demarcate S1 and S2 and so COS1, COS2 and says unconscious states (i.e., 
S1) can function in virtue of their propositional contents, which needs very careful 
elaboration describing how S1 generates and merges into S2 (as W did so well in 
”On Certainty”). 
 
Zheng is mostly excellent with the paragraph in the middle of p386 being fine, once 
translated into the S1, S2 dispositional language, and most of p392-3 on the 
background or network or bedrock (i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology) being 
as good a summary description of high level behavior as I have seen. 
 
I have no new comments on the final contribution by Mou, but S felt it showed TPI 
which is a contagious disease in modern philosophy, as it must be, since it is another 
manifestation of what W often referred to as the lack of perspicuity of language. 
 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times, and in my view one of the very best since 
Wittgenstein. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the many basic 
confusions manifested here and in the generally excellent attempts to connect 
classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. It is a great pity that it remains a 
rare expensive volume that nobody reads. 
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